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ABSTRACT:  The  theme  of  public  expenditure  has  been  of  great  interest  in  the  latest  years. 
Focusing on government size, role of government and the efficiency of the public sector becomes an 
even  more  important  issue  nowadays  when  the  financial  crisis  has  covered  severly  almost  all 
economies  worlwide.  The  debate  has  as  starting  point  the  keynesian  belief  (state  intervention 
overcomes recession periods) but also the division of the economy between the public and the 
private sector. Goods and services could be provided by the state, but many times the private sector 
seems to be more efficient. Using a specific econometrical analysis, the authors try to establish the 
optimal size of the public sector in both old and new member states of the European Union, a level 
that  fosters economic growth and suggest that, following this point, GDP should be left in the 
hands of the private sector. 
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The economic theory provides two main categories of arguments that explain the public 
sector size in time and among countries. The first category has as starting point the Wagner law, 
according to which the elasticity of governmental expenditures compared to GDP is greater than 1. 
As countries become more developed, the demand for public goods raises and is consistent with the 
increasing ability to collect the necessary funds. On the other hand, the “Baumol cost disease”, 
explains that the percentage of governmental expenditures increases because the raise of public 
servants’ salaries is higher than their productivity, while the price related to public services demand 
is relatively non elastic. The second category of arguments is political. For election purposes, the 
fiscal policies, especially those concerning the governmental expenditures, tend to be inconsistent 
in time and focuse on greater deficits and greater public sectors. This trend is more powerful if the 
number of parties forming the government is larger, if the election frequency is greater, and election 
system is proportional and not relying on majority. 
The theoretical studies support the idea that the long run relation between the size of the 
administrative sector and the economic growth has a concave shape. When the administrative sector 
is very small, the long term economic growth can be accelerated through the capital and labour 
productivity growth by increasing the provision of public goods. The marginal economic growth is 
positive but decreasing as the size of the administrative sector increases, and it becomes negative 
when additional charges harm the benefits resulting from increasing the productivity. The exact 
position of this turning point remains a key question. The response depends on structural factors, 
such as the economic cycle, the structure of public expenditures and the fiscal pressure. Using a 
specific econometrical analysis, the authors try to establish the optimal size of the public sector in 
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old and new member states of the European Union, which fosters economic growth and suggest 
that, following this point, GDP should be left in the hands of the private sector. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some theoretical approaches. Section 3 
outlines the methodological framework. Section 4 reveals the main econometrical results. Section 5 
reviews the final conclusions and some aspects concerning further research. 
 
Theoretical framework 
Starting with the theoretical framework proposed by Armey (1995), in this being proposed 
an  optimum  level  of  the  public  sector  within  the  economy,  we  focused  on  an  econometrical 
methodology, that is meant to identify the optimal size of government spending within the EU 15 
countries, respectively in the EU 12 countries. In order to achieve this objective, we have taken into 
consideration the real GDP growth and the total amount of public expenditures (as % of GDP), for 
the period 1999 2008.  
The subject of the paper is of wide interest, considering the fact that in the last decades,  
beginning  with  60’,  70’,  the  level  of  public  expenditure  as  %  of  GDP  has  been  permanently 
growing and the issue of a correct size of public expenditures in GDP has been largely debated. 
This subject is reviewed with an even more significant frequency during periods of economic and 
financial crisis, when the issue of management of public funds is of crucial interest. Analysing the 
historical data, we can conclude that both big governments and also those who had proceeded at 
reducing the level of the public expenditures, have reached a maximum level of the economic 
growth and of social welfare. This is the reason why we state that the optimum level of public 
expenditures varies within countries due to a range of social and economical factors that influence 
upon the management of public resources. An economy can function in optimum conditions when 
there  is  a  mix  between  the  force  of  the  market  economy  and  the  public  intervention  through 
allocation of public resources. 
Taking into consideration the analysis made by Grossman (1987), Scully (1994), Chao and 
Grubel (1998) or Pevcin (2004), we emphasize on the idea that a generalized optimum level of the 
public expenditure as % in GDP cannot be reached for more countries on a whole. Though, through 
the econometrical modelling, considering the past experiences, can be obtained an optimum level, 
but restricted to the conditions and limitations of the proposed model. An extension of the number 
of  observations,  for example,  using  wider  time  series, could lead to a  change  in the  proposed 
optimum level of public expenditures with several percents. 
The Armey curve outlines the fact that an increase in the level of public expenditures in 
GDP can be translated into social welfare and economic growth up to a certain level, beyond this 
point additional expenditures will be generating a reversed effect. 




Fig. no. 1 – Public expenditure and the economy (Armey curve) 
Source: Armey, 1995 
 
Methodological framework 
  The  empirical  test  regarding  the  existence  of  Armey  curve  can  be  illustrated  by  the 
following mathematical model: 
 
Q = f (G,N)                                                               (1) 
 
where Q measures the output of the economy,  G indicates the state intervention in the economy, 
while N shows the existence of some exogenous factors. We have considered the most adequate 
indicator for Q the real GDP growth (expressed in %), for G the public expenditure as % of GDP, 
while N was ignored. 
  Consequently, the model can be rewritten with the following non linear regression: 
 
GDP =  + 1 α 2
* 3 * 2 E E α α +                                                  (2) 
where: 
  GDP– dependent variable, real GDP growth (%); 
  Ch – independent variable, public expenditure (% in GDP); 
 
Computing the equation 2 as a function, that must me maximizied, leads to identifying the 
optimal level of public expenditure as % of GDP. In order to do that, we proceed to derivation of 
the function by E and equalize it to zero. We reach the following equation: 
 
2∗ 3 α ∗E +  2 α  = 0           (3) 
 
from where the optimum level of public expenditure: 







−            (4) 




The first model we propose indicates the optimal level of public expenditure for the old 
members of the European Union (EU 15)
3. It is an econometrical model of pool data type
4, that 
verifies the equation 2 and to which the heteroskedasticity and the general corellation of the cross 
sectional observations have been corrected, for the whole considered time period. Moreover, there 
have been taken into consideration the robustness of serial correlation and timevarying variances in 
the disturbances. The main econometrical results are illustrated in Tab. no.1. 
 
Table no. 1 
Econometrical results regarding the optimal level of public expenditures in the EU-15 
countries  
Dependent Variable: GDPC?     
Method: Pooled EGLS (Period SUR)   
Date: 08/25/09   Time: 15:55     
Sample: 1 10       
Included observations: 10     
Cross sections included: 15     
Total pool (balanced) observations: 150   
Linear estimation after one step weighting matrix 
White period standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t Statistic  Prob.   
         
          EXP?  0.260644  0.013733  18.97984  0.0000 
EXPP?   0.004284  0.000277   15.44947  0.0000 
         
            Weighted Statistics     
         
          R squared  0.792426     Mean dependent var  1.832273 
Adjusted R squared  0.791024     S.D. dependent var  2.197606 
S.E. of regression  1.004612     Sum squared resid  149.3683 
F statistic  564.9997     Durbin Watson stat  1.965158 
Prob(F statistic)  0.000000       
         
            Unweighted Statistics     
         
          R squared  0.143969     Mean dependent var  2.754667 
Sum squared resid  501.0964     Durbin Watson stat  0.864528 
         
         
Source: E views 5.0 
 
For checking the model stability, we have proceeded to a „unit root” checking of residuals, 
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Table no. 2 
„Unit root” testing of residuals in the case of modelling the optimal size of government 
expenditure the case of EU-15 countries  
Group unit root test: Summary    
Date: 08/25/09   Time: 16:05   
Sample: 1 10       
Series: RESID_BE, RESID_DK, RESID_DE, RESID_IE, RESID_GR, 
        RESID_ES, RESID_FR, RESID_IT, RESID_LU, RESID_NL, 
        RESID_AT, RESID_PT, RESID_FI, RESID_SE, RESID_UK 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags   
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
         
                Cross    
Method  Statistic  Prob.**  sections  Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*   3.47361   0.0003   15   131 
Breitung t stat   6.56689   0.0000   15   116 
         
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W stat    1.87651   0.0303   15   131 
ADF   Fisher Chi square   44.5699   0.0423   15   131 
PP   Fisher Chi square   28.0610   0.5672   15   135 
         
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z stat   3.97074   0.0000   15   150 
         
          ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
         square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
Source: E views 5.0 
 
All  tests,  except  PP Fisher,  Chi square  and  Hadri  Z stat  tests,  indicate  the  fact  that  the 
residuals do not have a “unit root”, fact that gives more quality and stability to the model (the DW 
test, with a value a litlle less than 2, confirm once again the same conclusion).  
  Equation 2 transforms itself in: 
 
PIB = 
2 0042 . 0 2606 . 0 xCh xCh−                                         (5) 
 
Solving the equation  2, as a function, that must be maximized, leads to  identifying  the 
optimal level of public spending as percent in GDP, more precisely, the level of 30,42 % of GDP.  
The second model we propose aims at finding the optimal level of public expenditures as 
percent of GDP in the new member states of the European Union (UE 12)
5. It is an econometrical 
model, of pool data type, in which there have been operated the same adjustments as in the previous 
model and that verifies also the equation 2.  
The econometrical results can be observed in Table no. 3:   
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Table no. 3 
Econometrical results regarding the optimal level of public expenditures in the EU-12 
countries  
Dependent Variable: GDPC?     
Method: Pooled EGLS (Period SUR)   
Date: 08/25/09   Time: 16:11     
Sample: 1 10       
Included observations: 10     
Cross sections included: 12     
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 118   
Linear estimation after one step weighting matrix 
White period standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t Statistic  Prob.   
         
          EXP?  0.491991  0.022836  21.54486  0.0000 
EXPP?   0.008956  0.000577   15.53296  0.0000 
         
            Weighted Statistics     
         
          R squared  0.831092     Mean dependent var  1.839395 
Adjusted R squared  0.829636     S.D. dependent var  2.376583 
S.E. of regression  0.980940     Sum squared resid  111.6202 
F statistic  570.7628     Durbin Watson stat  2.049608 
Prob(F statistic)  0.000000       
         
            Unweighted Statistics     
         
          R squared  0.243062     Mean dependent var  4.771186 
Sum squared resid  745.2678     Durbin Watson stat  1.144364 
         
         
Source: E views 5.0 
 
For checking the model stability, we have proceeded again at a „unit root” test, checking the 
residuals, the results being presented in Table no. 4. 
Table no. 4 
„Unit root” testing of residuals in the case of modelling the optimal size of government 
spending in the case of EU-12 countries  
Group unit root test: Summary    
Date: 08/25/09   Time: 16:19   
Sample: 1 10       
Series: RESID_BG, RESID_CZ, RESID_EE, RESID_CY, RESID_LV, 
        RESID_LT, RESID_HU, RESID_MT, RESID_PL, RESID_RO, 
        RESID_SI, RESID_SK   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags   
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
         
                Cross    
Method  Statistic  Prob.**  sections  Obs Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11(1), 2009 
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Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*   5.81970   0.0000   12   103 
Breitung t stat   1.92405   0.9728   12   91 
         
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W stat    2.65626   0.0040   12   103 
ADF   Fisher Chi square   46.5986   0.0037   12   103 
PP   Fisher Chi square   46.4716   0.0039   12   106 
         
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z stat   2.70215   0.0034   12   118 
         
          ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
         square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
  All tests, except Breitung t stat and partially Hadri Z stat, indicate the fact that the residuals 
do not have a “unit root”, confirming the quality and the stability of the model (including the DW 
test, with a value of 2, confirm once again the same conclusion).  
  Equation 2 transforms itself in: 
PIB = 
2 0089 . 0 * 4919 . 0 Ch Ch−                                          (6) 
 
As in the previous case, resolving the equation 2 as a function, that must be maximized, 
leads to the identification of the optimal size of public expenditure as percent of GDP, of 27,46 %.  
 
Conclusions 
The main result of this analysis reveals the fact that using specific analysis, public sector can 
be optimized, our specific results pointing towards an optimum public size in EU 15 of 30,42 % of 
GDP and in the EU 12 countries a level of 27,46 % of GDP. 
As far as concerns the EU 15 countries, the result suggests the fact that if the level of public 
expenditures would have been on average of 30,42 % in GDP in the analysed period of time, then it 
could have lead to a maximum rate of GDP growth of 3,96 %/year as average for the EU 15 
countries. This value is higher than the average values reached in the old member states of EU in 
the years of economic boom. In these years, there have been registered average values of maximum 
2 3 % as far as concerns the real GDP growth (as it is the case of Germany, Denmark, Belgium, 
France and Italy). In order to reach the proposed optimal size of public expenditures in GDP, it is 
imposed a significant drawback in the curent average level of public expenditure for the period 
1999 2008 for the EU 15 (of 46,47 % in GDP). It results a decline in the current level of public 
expenditures as percent of GDP with 16.05 %. 
Regarding the EU 12 countries, the result shows us that if the level of public expenditures in 
GDP would have been of 27,46 % on average in the analysed period, then this could have lead to a 
maximum  rate  of  GDP  growth  of  7,69  %/  year  (as  average  for  the  EU 12  states).  With  the 
exception of the Baltic countries, that have registered even values of real GDP growth of 7 10 % in 
the  1999 2008  period,  the  proposed  optimal  level  of  7,69  %  would  have  represented  a  pretty 
satisfying objective for the other Central and Eastern European countries. For reaching the optimal 
level of 27,46 % of GDP in what concerns the public expenditures for the EU 12 countries, implies 
declining in a significant way the current level of public expenditures, with over 13 % (from 41,1 % 
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